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Abstract
The secretary and the prophet inequality problems are central to the field of Stopping Theory.
Recently, there has been a lot of work in generalizing these models to multiple items because of
their applications in mechanism design. The most important of these generalizations are to ma-
troids and to combinatorial auctions (extends bipartite matching). Kleinberg-Weinberg [KW12]
and Feldman et al. [FGL15] show that for adversarial arrival order of random variables the
optimal prophet inequalities give a 1/2-approximation. For many settings, however, it’s con-
ceivable that the arrival order is chosen uniformly at random, akin to the secretary problem.
For such a random arrival model, we improve upon the 1/2-approximation and obtain (1−1/e)-
approximation prophet inequalities for both matroids and combinatorial auctions. This also
gives improvements to the results of Yan [Yan11] and Esfandiari et al. [EHLM17] who worked
in the special cases where we can fully control the arrival order or when there is only a single
item.
Our techniques are threshold based. We convert our discrete problem into a continuous
setting and then give a generic template on how to dynamically adjust these thresholds to lower
bound the expected total welfare.
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1 Introduction
Suppose there is a sequence of n buyers arriving with different values to your single item. On
arrival a buyer offers a take-it-or-leave-it value for your item. How should you decide which buyer
to assign the item to in order to maximize the value. There are two popular models in the field
of Stopping Theory to study this problem: the secretary and the prophet inequality models. In
the secretary model we assume no prior knowledge about the buyer values but the buyers arrive
in a uniformly random order [Dyn63]. Meanwhile, in the prophet inequality model we assume
stochastic knowledge about the buyer values but the arrival order of the buyers is chosen by an
adversary [KS78, KS77]. Since the two models complement each other, both have been widely
studied in the fields of mechanism design and combinatorial optimization (see related work).
These models assume that either the buyer values or the buyer arrival order is chosen by an
adversary. In practice, however, it is often conceivable that there is no adversary acting against
you. Can we design better strategies in such settings? The prophet secretary model introduced in
[EHLM17] is a natural way to consider such a process where we assume both a stochastic knowledge
about buyer values and that the buyers arrive in a uniformly random order. The goal is to design a
strategy that maximizes expected accepted value, where the expectation is over the random arrival
order, the stochastic buyer values, and also any internal randomness of the strategy.
In this paper, we consider generalizations of the above problem to combinatorial settings. Sup-
pose the buyers correspond to elements of a matroid1 and we are allowed to accept any inde-
pendent set in this matroid rather than only a single buyer. The buyers again arrive and offer
take-it-or-leave-it value for being accepted. In the prophet inequality model, a surprising result
of Kleinberg-Weinberg [KW12] gives a 1/2-approximation strategy to this problem, i.e., the value
of their strategy, in expectation, is at least half of the value of the expected offline optimum that
selects the best set of buyers in hindsight. Simple examples show that for adversarial arrival one
cannot improve this factor. On the other hand, if we are also allowed to control the arrival order of
the buyers, Yan [Yan11] gives a 1−1/e ≈ 0.63-approximation strategy. But what if the arrival order
is neither adversarial and nor in your control. In particular, can we beat the 1/2-approximation
for a uniformly random arrival order?
Matroid Prophet Secretary Problem (MPS): Given a matroid M = ([n],I) on n buyers
(elements) and independent probability distributions on their values, suppose the outcome buyer
values are revealed in a uniformly random order. Whenever a buyer value is revealed, the problem
is to immediately and irrevocably decide whether to select the buyer. The goal is to maximize the
sum of values of the selected buyers, while ensuring that they are always feasible in I.
Besides being a natural problem that relates two important Stopping Theory models, MPS is
also interesting because of its applications in mechanism design. Often while designing mechanisms,
we have to balance between maximizing revenue/welfare and the simplicity of the mechanism.
While there exist optimal mechanisms such as VCG or Myerson’s mechanism, they are impractical
in real markets [AM06, Rot07]. On the other hand, simple Sequentially Posted Pricing mechanisms,
where we offer take-it-or-leave-it prices to buyers, are known to give good approximations to optimal
mechanisms. This is because the problem gets reduced to designing a prophet inequality [CHMS10,
Yan11, Ala14, KW12, FGL15].
Esfandiari et al. [EHLM17] study MPS in the special case of a rank 1 matroid and give a
(1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm. For general matroids, as in the original models of [CHMS10,
1A matroid M consists of a ground set [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} and a non-empty downward-closed set system I ⊆ 2[n]
satisfying the matroid exchange axiom: for all pairs of sets I, J ∈ I such that |I | < |J |, there exists an element x ∈ J
such that I ∪ {x} ∈ I. Elements of I are called independent sets.
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Yan11, KW12], it was unclear prior to the work of this paper whether beating the factor of 1/2 is
possible. In Section 4 we prove the following result.
Theorem 1. There exists a (1− 1/e)-approximation algorithm to MPS.
Note that the approximation in this theorem as well as the following ones compare to the expected
optimal offline solution for the particular outcomes of the distributions. That is, in the case of
matroids, we have E[Alg] ≥ (1− 1/e) · E[maxI∈I
∑
i∈I vi], where vi is the value of buyer i
2.
Next, let us consider a combinatorial auctions setting. Suppose there are n buyers that take
combinatorial valuations (say, submodular) for m indivisible items from n independent probability
distributions. The problem is to decide how to allocate the items to the buyers, while trying to
maximize the welfare—the sum of valuations of all the buyers. Feldman et al. [FGL15] show that
for XOS3 (a generalization of submodular) valuations there exist static prices for items that gets a
1/2-approximation for buyers arriving in an adversarial order. Since this factor cannot be improved
for adversarial arrival, this leaves an important open question if we can design better algorithms
when the arrival order can be controlled. Or ideally, we want to beat 1/2 even when the arrival
order cannot be controlled but is chosen uniformly at random.
Combinatorial Auctions Prophet Secretary Problem (CAPS): Suppose n buyers take XOS
valuations for m items from n independent probability distributions. The outcome buyer valuations
are revealed in a uniformly random order. Whenever a buyer valuations is revealed, the problem
is to immediately and irrevocably assign a subset of the remaining items to the buyer. The goal is
maximize the sum of the valuations of all the buyers for their assigned subset of items.
In Section 3.2 we improve the online approximation result of [FGL15] for random order.
Theorem 2. There exists a (1− 1/e)-approximation algorithm to CAPS.
Given access to demand and XOS oracles for stochastic utilities of different buyers, the algorithm
in Theorem 2 can be made efficient. This is interesting because it matches the best possible
(1− 1/e)-approximation for XOS-welfare maximization in the offline setting [DNS10, Fei09].
A desirable property in the design of an economically viable mechanism is incentive-compatibility.
In particular, a buyer is more likely to make decisions about their allocations based on their own
personal incentives rather than to accept a given allocation that might optimize the social wel-
fare but not the individuals’ profit. For the important case of unit-demand buyers (aka bipartite
matching), in Section 3.1 we extend Theorem 2 to additionally obtain this property.
Theorem 3. For bipartite matchings, when buyers arrive in a uniformly random order, there exists
an incentive-compatible mechanism based on dynamic prices that gives a (1 − 1/e)-approximation
to the optimal welfare.
For this result, we require unit-demand buyers. This is because for general XOS functions
shifting buyers to earlier arrivals can change the availability of items arbitrarily. For unit-demand
functions, we show that this effect is bounded.
Finally, in Section 5 we conclude by showing that for the single-item case one can obtain a
(1− 1/e)-approximation even by using static prices, and that nothing better is possible.
2It’s not known if 1−1/e is tight for MPS. In fact, it’s even open if one can beat 1−1/e for a single item [AEE+17].
3A function v : 2M → R is an XOS function if there exists a collection of additive functions A1, . . . , Ak such that
for every S ⊆M we have v(S) = max1≤i≤k Ai(S).
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1.1 Our Techniques
In this section we discuss our three main ideas for a combinatorial auction. In this setting, our
algorithm is threshold based, which means that we set dynamic prices to the items and allow a
buyer to purchase a set of items only if her value is more than the price of that set. This allows us
to view total value as the sum of utility of the buyers and the total generated revenue. Although
powerful, dynamic prices often lead to involved calculations and become difficult to analyze beyond
a single item setting [EHLM17, AEE+17]. To overcome this issue, we convert our discrete problem
into a continuous setting. This is possible because a random permutation of buyers can be viewed
as each buyer arriving at a time chosen uniformly at random between 0 and 1. The benefit of such
a transformation is that the arrival times are independent, which keeps correlations managable.
Besides, it allow us to use tools from integral calculus such as integration by parts.
Our algorithm for combinatorial auctions sets a base price bj for every item j based on its
contribution to the expected offline optimum E[OPT]. Our approach is to define two time varying
continuous functions: discount and residual. The discount function α(t) : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is chosen
such that the price of an unsold item j at time t is exactly α(t) · bj. We define a residual function
r(t) : [0, 1] → R≥0 that intuitively denotes the expected value remaining in the instance at time t.
Hence, r(0) = E[OPT] and r(1) = 0. Computing r(t) is difficult for a combinatorial auction since
it depends on several random variables. However, assuming that we know r(t), we use application
specific techniques to compute lower bounds on both the expected revenue and the expected utility
in terms of the functions r(t) and α(t).
Finally, although we do not know r(t), we can choose the function α(t) in a way that allows us
to simplify the sum of expected revenue and utility, without ever computing r(t) explicitly. This
step exploits properties of the exponential function for integration (see Lemma 6).
1.2 Related Work
Starting with the works of Krengel-Sucheston [KS78, KS77] and Dynkin [Dyn63], there has been
a long line of research on both prophet inequalities and secretary problems. One of the first
generalizations is the multiple-choice prophet inequalities [Ken87, K+85, Ker86] in which we are
allowed to pick k items and the goal is to maximize their sum. Alaei [Ala14] gives an almost tight
(1 − 1/√k + 3)-approximation algorithm for this problem (the lower bound is due to [HKS07]).
Similarly, the multiple-choice secretary problem was first studied by Hajiaghayi et al. [HKP04],
and Kleinberg [Kle05] gives a (1−O(√1/k))-approximation algorithm.
The research investigating the relation between prophet inequalities and online auctions is
initiated in [HKS07, CHMS10]. This lead to several interesting follow up works for matroids [Yan11,
KW12] and matchings [AHL12]. Meanwhile, the connection between secretary problems and online
auctions is first explored in Hajiaghayi et al. [HKP04]. Its generalization to matroids is considered
in [BIK07, Lac14, FSZ15] and to matchings in [GM08, KP09, MY11, KMT11, KRTV13, GS17].
Secretary problems and prophet inequalities have also been studied beyond a matroid/matching.
For the intersection of p matroids, Kleinberg and Weinberg [KW12] give an O(p)-approximation
prophet inequality. Du¨tting and Kleinberg [DK15] extend this result to polymatroids. Feldman et
al. [FGL15] study the generalizations to combinatorial auctions. Later, Du¨tting et al. [DFKL17]
give a general framework to prove such prophet inequalities. Submodular variants of the secretary
problem have been considered in [BHZ10, GRST10, FZ15, KMZ15]. Prophet and secretary prob-
lems have also been studied for many classical combinatorial problems (see e.g., [Mey01, GGLS08,
GHK+14, DEH+15, DEH+17]). Rubinstein [Rub16] and Rubinstein-Singla [RS17] consider these
problems for arbitrary downward-closed constraints.
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In the prophet secretary model, Esfandiari et al. [EHLM17] give a (1 − 1/e)-approximation
in the special case of a single item. Going beyond 1 − 1/e has been challenging. Only recently,
Abolhasani et al. [AEE+17] and Correa et al. [CFH+17] improve this factor for the single item i.i.d.
setting. Extending this result to non-identical items or to matroids are interesting open problems.
2 Our Approach using a Residual
In this section, we define a residual and discuss how it can be used to design an approximation
algorithm for a prophet secretary problem. Suppose there are n requests that arrive at times
(Ti)i∈[n] drawn i.i.d. from the uniform distribution in [0, 1]. These requests correspond to buyers
of a combinatorial auction or to elements of a matroid.
Whenever a request arrives, we have to decide if and how to serve it. Depending on how we
serve request i, say xi, we gain a certain value vi(xi). Our task is to maximize the sum of values
over all requests
∑n
i=1 vi(xi). Our algorithm Alg includes a time-dependent payment component.
The payment that request i has to make is the product of a time-dependent discount function α(t)
and a base price b(xi). The base price depends on the allocation up to this point and how much
the new choice limits other allocations in the future. However, it does not depend on t, the time
that has passed up to this point. If request i has to pay pi(xi, Ti) = α(Ti, b(xi) for our decision
xi, then its utility is given by ui = vi(xi) − pi(xi, Ti). We write Utility =
∑n
i=1 ui for the sum of
utilities and Revenue =
∑n
i=1 pi(xi, Ti) for the sum of payments. The value achieved by Alg equals
Utility + Revenue.
Next we define a residual function that has the interpretation of “expected remaining value in
the instance at time t”. In Lemma 6 we show that the existence of a residual function for Alg
suffices to give a (1− 1/e)-approximation prophet secretary.
Definition 4 (Residual). Consider a prophet secretary problem with expected offline value E[OPT].
For any algorithm Alg based on a differentiable discount function α(t) : [0, 1] → [0, 1], a differen-
tiable function r(t) : [0, 1]→ R≥0 is called a residual if it satisfies the following three conditions for
every choice of α.
r(0) = E[OPT] (1a)
E[Revenue] ≥ −
∫ 1
t=0
α(t) · r′(t) · dt (1b)
E[Utility] ≥
∫ 1
t=0
(1− α(t)) · r(t) · dt. (1c)
We would like to remark here that this definition is similar in spirit to balanced thresholds
[KW12] and balanced prices [DFKL17]. However, it is different because we have to take into
account the random arrivals.
As an illustration of Definition 4, consider the case of a single item. That is, we are presented a
sequence of n real numbers and may select only up to one of them (previously studied in [EHLM17]).
Example 5 (Single Item). Suppose buyer i ∈ [n] arrives with random value vi at time Ti chosen
uniformly at random between 0 and 1. Define b = E[maxi vi] as the base price of the single item.
A buyer arriving at time t is offered the item at price α(t) · b, and she accepts the offer if and only
if vi ≥ α(t) · b. We show that r(t) = Pr[item not sold before t] · b is a residual function.
By definition, (1a) holds trivially. To see that (1b) holds, observe that the increase in revenue
from time t to time t+ ǫ is approximately α(t) · b if the item is allocated during this time, and is 0
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otherwise. That is, the expected increase in revenue is approximately α(t)(r(t) − r(t+ ǫ)). Taking
the limit for ǫ→ 0 then implies (1b), i.e., E[Revenue] = − ∫ 1
t=0 α(t)r
′(t)dt.
For (1c), we consider the expected utility of a buyer i conditioning on her arriving at time t
E[ui | Ti = t] = E[1item not sold before t · (vi − α(t) · b)+ | Ti = t]
= Pr[item not sold before t | Ti = t] · E[(vi − α(t) · b)+].
Here we use that the event the item is sold before t does not depend on vi because buyer i only
arrives at time t. The expectation in turn only depends on vi. It is also important to observe
that Pr[item not sold before t | Ti = t] ≥ Pr[item not sold before t]. Next, we take the sum over all
buyers i and use that E[
∑n
i=1(vi−α(t)·b)+] ≥ E[maxi(vi−α(t)·b)] = E[maxi vi]−α(t)·b = (1−α(t))·b
to get
n∑
i=1
E[ui | Ti = t] ≥ Pr[item not sold before t] · (1− α(t)) · b = (1− α(t)) · r(t).
This implies
E[Utility] =
n∑
i=1
∫ 1
t=0
E[ui | Ti = t]dt =
∫ 1
t=0
n∑
i=1
E[ui | Ti = t]dt ≥
∫ 1
t=0
(1− α(t)) · r(t) · dt.
We now use the properties of a residual function to design a (1−1/e)-approximation algorithm.
To this end, we choose α(t) in a manner that makes the sum of the expected revenue and buyers’
utilities independent of r(t). This allows us to compute expected welfare, even though we cannot
compute r(t) directly.
Lemma 6. For a prophet secretary problem, if there exists a residual function r(t) for algorithm
Alg as defined in Definition 4, then setting α(t) = 1− et−1 gives a (1− 1/e)-approximation.
Proof. To further simplify Eq. (1b), we observe that applying integration by parts gives∫
r′(t) · α(t) · dt = r(t) · α(t)−
∫
r(t)α′(t) · dt.
So in combination
E[Revenue] ≥ −
(
[r(t) · α(t)]1t=0 −
∫ 1
t=0
r(t) · α′(t) · dt
)
. (2)
Now adding (2) and (1c) gives,
E[Alg] = E[Utility] + E[Revenue]
≥
∫ 1
t=0
r(t) · (1− α(t)) · dt− [r(t)α(t)]1t=0 +
∫ 1
t=0
r(t)α′(t) · dt
=
∫ 1
t=0
r(t) · (1− α(t) + α′(t)) · dt− [r(t)α(t)]1t=0 .
Although we do not know r(t) and computing
∫ 1
t=0 r(t) · (1 − α(t) + α′(t)) · dt seems difficult, we
have the liberty of selecting the function α(t). By choosing α(t) satisfying 1− α(t) + α′(t) = 0 for
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all t, this integral becomes independent of r(t) and simplifies to 0. In particular, let α(t) = 1−et−1.
This gives,
E[Alg] ≥ − [r(t) · α(t)]1t=0
=
(
1− 1
e
)
r(0)
=
(
1− 1
e
)
E[OPT] .
3 Prophet Secretary for Combinatorial Auctions
Let N denote a set of n buyers and M denote the set of m indivisible items. Suppose buyer i
arrives at a time Ti chosen uniformly at random between 0 and 1. Let vi : 2
M → R≥0 (similarly
vˆi) denote the random combinatorial valuation function of buyer i. In order to ensure polynomial
running times, we assume that the distribution of vi has a polynomial support {v1i , v2i , . . . , }, where∑
k Pr[vi = v
k
i ] = 1. Note that this assumption only simplifies notation. If we only have sample
access to the distributions, then we can replace {v1i , v2i , . . . , } by an appropriate number of samples.
Within our proofs, we will use vˆ to denote an independent, fresh sample from the distribution.
By T and v (similarly vˆ) we denote the vector of all the buyer arrival times and valuations,
respectively. Also, let v−i (similarly vˆ−i) denote valuations of all buyers except buyer i. For the
special case of single items, we let vij denote vi({j}). Let qj(t) denote the probability that item
j has not been sold before time t, where the probability is over valuations v, arrival times T, and
any randomness of the algorithm.
3.1 Bipartite Matching
In the bipartite matching setting all buyers are unit-demand, i.e. vi(S) = maxj∈S vij . We can
therefore assume that no buyer buys more than one item. We restate our result.
Theorem 3. For bipartite matchings, when buyers arrive in a uniformly random order, there exists
an incentive-compatible mechanism based on dynamic prices that gives a (1 − 1/e)-approximation
to the optimal welfare.
To define prices of items, let base price bj denote the expected value of the buyer that buys
item j in the offline welfare maximizing allocation (maximum weight matching). Now consider an
algorithm that prices item j at α(t) · bj at time t and allows the incoming buyer to pick any of the
unsold items; here α(t) is a continuous differentiable discount function.
Consider the function r(t) =
∑
j qj(t)·bj . Clearly, r(0) = E[OPT]. Using the following Lemma 7
and Claim 8, we prove that r is a residual function for our algorithm. Since the algorithm is clearly
incentive-compatible, Lemma 6 implies Theorem 3.
Lemma 7. We can lower bound the total expected utility by
Ev,T[Utility] ≥
∑
j
∫ 1
t=0
qj(t) · (1− α(t)) · bj · dt. (3)
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Proof. Since buyer i arriving at time t can pick any of the unsold items, we have
Ev,T[ui | Ti = t] = Ev
[
max
j
1j not sold before t · (vi,j − α(t) · bj)+
∣∣∣∣ Ti = t
]
.
One particular choice of buyer i is to choose item OPTi(vi, vˆ−i) if it is still available, and no item
otherwise. This gives us a lower bound of
Ev,T[ui | Ti = t] ≥ Ev
[
1OPTi(vi, vˆ−i) not sold before t ·
(
vi,OPTi(vi,vˆ−i) − α(t) · bj
)+ ∣∣∣ Ti = t]
=
∑
j
Ev,vˆ
[
1j not sold before t · 1j=OPTi(vi,vˆ−i) · (vi,j − α(t) · bj)+
∣∣ Ti = t] .
Note that in the product, the fact whether j is sold before t only depends on v−i and the arrival
times of the other buyers. It does not depend on vi or vˆ. The remaining terms, in contrast, only
depend on vi and vˆ−i. Therefore, we can use independence to split up the expectation and get
Ev,T[ui | Ti = t]
≥
∑
j
Pr[j not sold before t | Ti = t] · Evi,vˆ−i
[
1j=OPTi(vi,vˆ−i) · (vi,j − α(t) · bj)+
∣∣ Ti = t] .
Next, we use that Pr[j not sold before t | Ti = t] ≥ qj(t) by Lemma 9 and that vi and vˆi are
identically distributed. Therefore, we can swap their roles inside the expectation. Overall, this
gives us
Ev,T[ui | Ti = t] ≥
∑
j
qj(t) · Evˆ
[
1j=OPTi(vˆ) · (vˆi,j − α(t) · bj)
]
. (4)
Next, observe that Evˆ[
∑
i 1j=OPTi(vˆ) · vˆi,j] = bj by the definition of bj. Therefore, using linearity
of expectation, summing up (4) over all buyers i gives us∑
i
Ev,T[ui | Ti = t] ≥ qj(t) · (1− α(t)) · bj.
Now, taking the expectation over t, we get
Ev,T
[∑
i
ui
]
=
∑
i
∫ 1
t=0
Ev,T[ui | Ti = t] · dt
=
∫ 1
t=0
∑
i
Ev,T[ui | Ti = t] · dt
≥
∫ 1
t=0
∑
j
qj(t) · (1− α(t)) · bj · dt
=
∑
j
∫ 1
t=0
qj(t) · (1− α(t)) · bj · dt .
We next give a bound on the revenue generated by our algorithm.
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Claim 8. We can bound the total expected revenue by
Ev,T[Revenue] = −
∑
j
∫ 1
t=0
q′j(t)α(t) · bj · dt. (5)
Proof. Since −q′j(t)dt is the probability that item j is bought between t and t + dt (note qj(t) is
decreasing in t), we have
E[Revenue] = −
∑
j
∫ 1
t=0
q′j(t)α(t) · bj · dt .
Finally, we prove the missing lemma that removes the conditioning on the arrival time.
Lemma 9. We have
Ev−i
[
Pr
T
[j not sold before t | Ti = t]
]
≥ qj(t).
The idea is that if buyers arrive earlier in the process, this only reduces the available items. It
can never happen that such a change makes an item available at a later point. For a single item
this is trivial, for multiple items and other combinatorial valuations it does not necessarily hold.
Proof. Consider the execution of our algorithm on two sequences that only differ in the arrival time
of buyer i. To this end, let v be arbitrary values and T be arbitrary arrival times. Let At′ be the
set of items that are sold before time t′ on the sequence defined by v and T. Furthermore, let Bt′
be the set of items sold before time t′ if we replace Ti by t. Ties are broken in the same way in
both sequences.
We claim that Bt′ ⊆ At′ for all t′ ≤ t.
To this end, we observe that by definition Bt′ = At′ for t
′ ≤ min{Ti, t} because the two sequences
are identical before min{Ti, t}. This already shows the claim for Ti ≥ t. Otherwise, assume that
there is some t′ ≤ t for which Bt′ 6⊆ At′ . Let tinf be the infimum among these t′. It has to hold that
some buyer i′ arrives at time tinf and buys item jA 6∈ Atinf in the original sequence and jB 6∈ Btinf
in the modified sequence. Furthermore, we now have to have Btinf 6⊆ Atinf because tinf was defined
to be the infimum of all t′ for which Bt′ ⊆ At′ is not fulfilled. Therefore, jA 6∈ Btinf . Additionally,
jB 6∈ Atinf . The reason is that for any t′ < tinf before the next arrival Bt′ = Btinf ∪ {jB}.
Overall this means that in both sequences at time tinf buyer i
′ has the choice between jB and
jA. As his values are identical and ties are broken the same way, it has to hold that jB = jA, which
then contradicts that Btinf 6⊆ Atinf .
Taking the expectation over both v and T, we get
Pr
T,v
[j 6∈ At] ≤ Pr
T,v
[j 6∈ Bt].
This implies the Lemma 9 because
Pr
T,v
[j not sold before t] = Pr
T,v
[j 6∈ At]
Pr
T,v
[j not sold before t | Ti = t] = Pr
T,v
[j 6∈ Bt].
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3.2 XOS Combinatorial Auctions
In this section we prove our main result (restated below) for combinatorial auctions.
Theorem 2. There exists a (1− 1/e)-approximation algorithm to CAPS.
Recollect that the random valuation vi of every buyer i has a polynomial support. We can
therefore write the following expectation-version of the configuration LP, which gives us an upper
bound on the expected offline social welfare.
max
∑
i
∑
k
∑
S
vki (S) · xki,S
s.t.
∑
i
∑
k
∑
S:j∈S
xki,S = 1 for all j ∈M
∑
S
xki,S = Pr[vi = v
k
i ] for all i, k
The above configuration LP can be solved with a polynomial number of calls to demand oracles
of buyer valuations (see [DNS10]). Since all functions vki are XOS, there exist additive supporting
valuations; that is, there exist numbers vk,Si,j ≥ 0 s.t. vk,Si,j = 0 for j 6∈ S,
∑
j∈S v
k,S
i,j = v
k
i (S), and∑
j∈S′ v
k,S
i,j ≤ vki (S′) for all S′. Before describing our algorithm, we define a base price for every
item.
Definition 10. The base price bj of every item j ∈M is
∑
i,k
∑
S:j∈S v
k,S
i,j x
k
i,S.
Since
∑
S x
k
i,S = Pr[vi = v
k
i ], consider an algorithm that on arrival of buyer i with valuation v
k
i
draws an independent random set S with probability xki,S/Pr[vi = v
k
i ]. Let S
∗
i denote this drawn
set. This distribution also satisfies that for every item j,
∑
i
Evi,S
∗
i
[
1j∈S∗i · v
k,S∗i
i,j
]
=
∑
i,k
Pr[vi = v
k
i ] ·
∑
S:j∈S
xki,S
Pr[vi = vki ]
· vk,S∗ii,j = bj . (6)
Now consider the supporting additive valuation for S∗i in the XOS valuation function v
k
i of buyer
i. This can be found using the XOS oracle for vki [DNS10]. Our algorithm assigns her every item
j that has not been allocated so far and for which v
k,S∗i
i,j ≥ α(t) · bj, where α(t) is a continuous
differentiable function of t. Note that since we do not allow buyer i to choose items outside set S∗i ,
the mechanism defined by this algorithm need not be incentive compatible.
Consider the function r(t) =
∑
j qj(t) · bj, where again qj(t) denotes the probability that item j
has not been sold before time t. Clearly, r(0) = OPT . Using the following Lemma 11 and Claim 12,
we prove that r is a residual function for our algorithm. Hence, Lemma 6 implies Theorem 2.
Lemma 11. The expected utility of the above algorithm is lower bounded by
Ev,T[Utility] ≥
∑
j
∫ 1
t=0
qj(t) · (1− α(t)) · bj · dt. (7)
Proof. Given that buyer i arrives at t and only buys item j if v
k,S∗i
i,j ≥ α(t) · bj, her utility is
Ev,T[ui | Ti = t] =
∑
j
Ev,T,S∗i
[
1j not sold by t · 1j∈S∗i ·
(
v
k,S∗i
i,j − α(t) · bj
)+ ∣∣∣∣ Ti = t
]
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Using the fact that whether j is sold before t only depends on v−i and T, and not on vi or S
∗
i ,
Ev,T[ui | Ti = t] =
∑
j
Pr
v−i,T
[j not sold by t | Ti = t] · Evi,S∗i
[
1j∈S∗i ·
(
v
k,S∗i
i,j − α(t) · bj
)+]
.
Now, observe that in our algorithm every buyer i independently decides which set of items S∗i it
will attempt to buy. Crucially, the probability of an item j being sold by time t can only increase
if more buyers arrive before t. Therefore,
Pr
v−i,T
[j not sold by t | Ti = t] ≥ Pr
v,T
[j not sold by t] = qj(t).
Thus, we get
Ev,T[ui | Ti = t] ≥
∑
j
qj(t) · Evi,S∗i
[
1j∈S∗i ·
(
v
k,S∗i
i,j − α(t) · bj
)+]
≥
∑
j
qj(t) · Evi,S∗i
[
1j∈S∗i ·
(
v
k,S∗i
i,j − α(t) · bj
)]
.
Finally, recollect from Eq. (6) that
∑
i Evi,S
∗
i
[
1j∈S∗i · v
k,S∗i
i,j
]
= bj . Moreover,
∑
i
Evi,S
∗
i
[
1j∈S∗i
]
=
∑
i,k
Pr[vi = v
k
i ] ·
∑
S:j∈S
xki,S
Pr[vi = vki ]
= 1.
Hence, by linearity of expectation∑
i
E[ui | Ti = t] ≥
∑
j
qj(t) · (1− α(t)) · bj.
We next give a bound on the revenue generated by our algorithm.
Claim 12. We can bound the total expected revenue by
Ev,T[Revenue] = −
∑
j
∫ 1
t=0
q′j(t)α(t) · bj · dt. (8)
Proof. Since −q′j(t)dt is the probability that item j is bought between t and t + dt (note qj(t) is
decreasing in t), we have
E[Revenue] = −
∑
j
∫ 1
t=0
q′j(t)α(t) · bj · dt .
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4 Prophet Secretary for Matroids
Let vi denote the random value of the i’th buyer (element) and let vˆi denote another independent
draw from the value distribution of the i’th buyer. The problem is to select a subset I of the buyers
that form a feasible set in matroid M, while trying to maximize ∑i∈I vi. We restate our main
result for the matroid setting.
Theorem 1. There exists a (1− 1/e)-approximation algorithm to MPS.
We need the following notation to describe our algorithm.
Definition 13. For a given vector vˆ of values of n items and A ⊆ [n], we define the following:
• Let Opt(vˆ | A)⊆ [n] \ A denote the optimal solution set in the contracted matroid M/A.
• Let R(A, vˆ) :=∑i∈Opt(vˆ|A) vˆi denote the remaining value after selecting set A.
We next define a base price of for every buyer i.
Definition 14. Let A denote the independent set of buyers that have been accepted till now.
• Let bi(A, vˆ) := R(A, vˆ)−R(A ∪ {i}, vˆ) denote a threshold for buyer i.
• Let bi(A) := Evˆ[bi(A, vˆ)] denote the base price for buyer i.
Starting with A0 = ∅, let At denote the set of accepted buyers before time t. This is a random
variable that depends on the values v and arrival times T. Suppose a buyer i arrives at time t,
then our algorithm selects i iff both vi > α(t) · bi(At) and selecting i is feasible in M.
Consider the function r(t) := Ev,vˆ,T[R(At, vˆ)], where At is a function of v and T. Clearly,
r(0) = E[OPT]. Using the following Lemma 16 and Claim 15, we prove that r is a residual
function. Hence, Lemma 6 implies Theorem 1.
Claim 15.
Ev,T[Revenue] = −
∫ 1
t=0
α(t) · r′(t)dt.
Proof. Consider the time from t to t+ ǫ for some t ∈ [0, 1], ǫ > 0. Let us fix the arrival times T and
values v of all elements. This also fixes the sets (At)t∈[0,1]. Let i1, . . . , ik be the arrivals between
t and t + ǫ that get accepted in this order. Note that it is also possible that k = 0. The revenue
obtained between t and t+ ǫ is now given as
Revenue≤t+ǫ − Revenue≤t =
k∑
j=1
α(tij )bij (Atij )
=
k∑
j=1
α(tij )Evˆ [R(At ∪ {i1, . . . ij−1}, vˆ)−R(At ∪ {i1, . . . ij}, vˆ)]
≥ α(t+ ǫ)Evˆ [R(At, vˆ)−R(At+ǫ, vˆ)] .
Taking the expectation over v and T, we get by linearity of expectation
Ev,T[Revenue≤t+ǫ]− Ev,T[Revenue≤t] ≥ α(t+ ǫ)(r(t)− r(t+ ǫ)).
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By the same argument, we also have
Ev,T[Revenue≤t+ǫ]− Ev,T[Revenue≤t] ≤ α(t)(r(t) − r(t+ ǫ)).
In combination, we get that
d
dt
Ev,T[Revenue≤t] = −α(t)r′(t),
which implies the claim.
Lemma 16.
Ev,T[Utility] ≥
∫ 1
t=0
(1− α(t)) · r(t)dt.
Proof. The utility of buyer i arriving at time t is given by
Ev,T[ui | Ti = t] = Ev,T−i
[
(vi − α(t) · bi(At))+ · 1i 6∈Span(At)
∣∣ Ti = t] .
Observe that At does not depend on vi if Ti = t because it includes only the acceptances before
t. It does not depend on vˆi either, as vˆi is only used for analysis purposes and not known to the
algorithm. Since vi and vˆi are identically distributed, we can also write
Ev,T[ui | Ti = t] = Ev,vˆ,T−i
[
(vˆi − α(t) · bi(At))+ · 1i 6∈Span(At)
∣∣ Ti = t] . (9)
Now observe that buyer i can belong to Opt(vˆ | At) only if it’s not already in Span(At), which
implies 1i 6∈Span(At) ≥ 1i∈Opt(vˆ|At). Using this and removing non-negativity, we get
Ev,T[ui | Ti = t] ≥ Ev,vˆ,T−i
[
(vˆi − α(t) · bi(At)) · 1i∈Opt(vˆ|At)
∣∣ Ti = t] .
Now we use Lemma 17 to remove the conditioning on buyer i arriving at time t as this gives a valid
lower bound on expected utility,
Ev,T[ui | Ti = t] ≥ Ev,vˆ,T
[
(vˆi − α(t) · bi(At)) · 1i∈Opt(vˆ|At)
]
. (10)
We can now lower bound sum of buyers’ utilities using Eq. (10) to get
Ev,T[Utility] =
∑
i
∫ 1
t=0
Ev,T[ui | Ti = t] · dt
≥
∑
i
∫ 1
t=0
Ev,vˆ,T
[
(vˆi − α(t) · bi(At)) · 1i∈Opt(vˆ|At)
] · dt.
By moving the sum over buyers inside the integrals, we get
Ev,T[Utility] ≥
∫ 1
t=0
Ev,vˆ,T
[∑
i
(vˆi − α(t) · bi(At)) · 1i∈Opt(vˆ|At)
]
· dt
=
∫ 1
t=0
Ev,vˆ,T

R(At, vˆ)− α(t) · ∑
i∈Opt(vˆ|At)
bi(At)

 · dt.
Finally, using Lemma 18 for V = Opt(vˆ | At), we get
Ev,T[Utility] ≥
∫ 1
t=0
Ev,vˆ,T [(1− α(t)) ·R(At, vˆ)] · dt.
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Finally, we prove the missing lemma that removes the conditioning on item i arriving at t.
Lemma 17. For any i, any time t, and any fixed v, vˆ, we have
ET−i
[
(vˆi − α(t) · bi(At)) · 1i∈Opt(vˆ|At) | Ti = t
] ≥ ET [(vˆi − α(t) · bi(At)) · 1i∈Opt(vˆ|At)] .
Proof. We prove the lemma for any fixed T−i. Suppose we draw a uniformly random Ti ∈ [0, 1].
Observe that if Ti ≥ t then we have equality in the above equation because set At is the same both
with and without i. This is also the case when Ti < t but i is not selected into At. Finally, when
Ti < t and i ∈ At we have 1i∈Opt(vˆ|At) = 0 in the presence of item i (i.e., RHS of lemma), making
the inequality trivially true.
Lemma 18. For any fixed v,T, time t, and set of elements V that is independent in the matroid
M/At, we have ∑
i∈V
bi(At) ≤ Evˆ [R(At, vˆ)] .
Proof. By definition
∑
i∈V
bi(At) = Evˆ
[∑
i∈V
(R(At, vˆ)−R(At ∪ {i}, vˆ))
]
.
Fix the values vˆ arbitrarily, we also have∑
i∈V
(R(At, vˆ)−R(At ∪ {i}, vˆ)) ≤ R(At, vˆ).
This follows from the fact that R(At, vˆ) − R(At ∪ {i}, vˆ) are the respective critical values of the
greedy algorithm onM/At with values vˆ. Therefore, the bound follows from Lemma 3.2 in [LB10].
An alternative proof is given as Proposition 2 in [KW12] while in our case the first inequality can
be skipped and the remaining steps can be followed replacing A by At.
Taking the expectation over vˆ, the claim follows.
5 Fixed Threshold Algorithms
In this section we discuss the powers and limitations of Fixed-Threshold Algorithms (FTAs) for
single item prophet secretary. In an FTA, we set a fixed threshold for the item at the beginning
of the process and then assign it to the first buyer whose valuation exceeds the threshold. The
motivation to study FTAs comes from their simplicity, transparency, and fairness in the design of
a posted price mechanism (see, e.g., [FGL15]).
In Section 5.1, we give a (1 − 1/e)-approximation FTA for single-item prophet secretary. This
seemingly contradicts earlier impossibility results (e.g., [FGL15, EHLM17]). However, as we show,
these impossibility results do not hold in case of continuous distributions or equivalently randomized
tie-breaking. Next, in Section 5.2, we present an upper bound for FTAs. In particular, we show that
there is no FTA, even for identical distributions, with an approximation factor better than 1− 1/e.
This indicates the tightness of our algorithm for prophet secretary. Furthermore, in Appendix A
we generalize these single item ideas to present an alternate (1− 1/e)-approximation algorithm for
bipartite matching prophet secretary.
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5.1 Single Item Prophet Secretary
Recall, by T and v we denote the random vector of all the buyer arrival times and valuations,
respectively. Also, q(t) denotes the probability that the item is unsold till time t, where the
probability is over valuations v, arrival times T, and any randomness of the algorithm. We show
that a fixed threshold algorithm that selects τ s.t.
Pr
v
[max{vi} ≤ τ ] =
∏
i
Pr[vi ≤ τ ] = 1
e
gives a (1− 1/e)-approximation.
Theorem 19. There exists a (1− 1/e)-approximation FTA to single-item prophet secretary.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume all distributions have a finite expectation and a continuous
CDF4. As two extreme selections for the threshold, if we set τ to zero then the FTA selects the first
item, and if we set it to infinity then no item will be selected. Therefore, the assumption for the
continuity of the distribution function allows us to select a threshold τ such that the FTA reaches
the end of the sequence with an exact probability of 1/e. This means all of drawn values are below
τ with probability 1/e. In the remainder, we show that the FTA based on this choice of τ lead to
a (1− 1/e)-approximation algorithm.
Let OPT denote maxi{vi} and Alg be a random variable that indicates the value selected by
the algorithm, or is zero if no item is selected. The goal is to show
E[Alg] ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
· E[OPT].
We have E[Alg] = E[Revenue]+E[Utility]. By definition of τ , the algorithm sells the item with
probability exactly 1− 1/e; therefore, E[Revenue] = (1− 1
e
)
τ . Below, we show
E[Utility] ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
· E[(OPT − τ)+]. (11)
This suffices to prove Theorem 19 because
E[Alg] = E[Revenue] + E[Utility] ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
τ +
(
1− 1
e
)
E[(OPT− τ)+] ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
E[OPT].
We now prove Eq. (11). For the utility, we know
E[Utility] =
∫ 1
t=0
n∑
i=1
E[ui | Ti = t] · dt
=
∫ 1
t=0
n∑
i=1
Pr[item not sold before t | Ti = t] · E[(vi − τ)+] · dt
≥
∫ 1
t=0
n∑
i=1
q(t) · E[(vi − τ)+] · dt
=
n∑
i=1
E[(vi − τ)+] ·
∫ 1
t=0
q(t) · dt,
4This assumption is without loss because the actual CDF can be approximated with arbitrary precision by a
continuous function. This approximation corresponds to a randomized tie-breaking in case of point masses.
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where the inequality uses the observation Pr[item not sold before t | Ti = t] ≥ Pr[item not sold before t].
In the following Lemma 20, we show q(t) ≥ exp(−t). This implies ∫ 1
t=0 q(t) · dt ≥ 1 − 1e , which
proves the missing Eq. (11) because
n∑
i=1
E[(vi − τ)+] ≥ E[(max
i
{vi} − τ)+] = E[(OPT− τ)+].
Lemma 20. For t ∈ [0, 1], we have
q(t) ≥ exp(−t).
Proof. Observe that
q(t) =
n∏
i=1
Pr[i does not buy the item till t].
Since i gets the item only by arriving before t and having a value above τ , we get
q(t) =
n∏
i=1
(1− t · Pr[vi > τ ]) = exp
(
n∑
i=1
ln(1− t · Pr[vi > τ ])
)
.
Notice that for t, x ∈ [0, 1), we have ln(1− tx) ≥ t · ln(1− x). This gives,
q(t) ≥ exp
(
t ·
n∑
i=1
ln(1− Pr[vi > τ ])
)
= exp(t · ln(1/e)) = exp(−t),
where we use
∏n
i=1(1− Pr[vi > τ ]) = 1e by definition of τ .
5.2 Impossibility for IID Prophet Inequalities
In the following we prove an impossibility result for FTAs for single item prophet secretary. We
show this impossibility even for the special case of iid items. For every n, we give a common
distribution D for every item such that no FTA can achieve an approximation factor better than
1− 1/e. This also implies the tightness of the algorithm discussed in Section 5.1.
Theorem 21. Any FTA for iid prophet inequality is at most (1− 1
e
+O( 1
n
))-approximation5.
Proof. We prove the theorem by giving a hard input instance for every n as follows: every vi is
n/(e− 1) with probability 1/n2 and is (e− 2)/(e− 1) otherwise. The expected maximum value of
these n items is
E[OPT] =
(
1− 1
n2
)n
· e− 2
e− 1 +
(
1−
(
1− 1
n2
)n) n
e− 1
= 1−O
(
1
n
)
.
In this instance, if τ < (e−2)/(e−1) then the algorithm selects the first item, and if (e−2)/(e−
1) < τ ≤ n/(e− 1) then the algorithm can only select n/(e− 1). In these cases the approximation
factor can be at most (e− 2)/(e − 1) ≈ 0.58.
5Jose Correa later pointed to us that the lower bound in Theorem 21 also follows from a result in [CFH+17].
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Now, note that the CDF of this input distribution is not continuous. Reshaping a discrete
distribution function into a continuous one, however, does not change the approximation factor
because in the above example we only need a slight change at the point (e − 2)/(e − 1) of the
CDF. This change gives us a randomness when τ = (e− 2)/(e− 1), which is equivalent to flipping
a random coin and skipping every item with some probability p ≤ 1 − 1/n2 if the drawn value is
(e− 2)/(e − 1). With this assumption we have
E[Alg] =
n∑
i=1
pi E[vi · 1vi≥τ ]
=
1− pn
1− p E[vi · 1vi≥τ ]
=
1− pn
1− p
((
1− 1
n2
− p
)
e− 2
e− 1 +
1
n2
n
e− 1
)
<
1− pn
e− 1
(
e− 2 + 1
n(1− p)
)
. (12)
To complete the proof, it suffices to show that the right hand side of Inequality (12) is at most
1−1/e+O(1/n). To this end, we try to maximize this term based on parameter c where p = 1−c/n.
We can rewrite the right hand side of the inequality as
1− (1− c
n
)n
e− 1
(
e− 2 + 1
c
)
.
If c = Θ(n) then this term is at most (e−2+Θ(1/n))/(e−1) ≈ 0.41+O(1/n), which is below 1−1/e
for sufficiently large n. Otherwise c/n ≪ 1 and we can approximate (1 − c/n)n as e−c + O(1/n).
This upper bounds Inequality (12) by (1−e−c)(e−2+1/c)/(e−1)+O(1/n), where the first term is
independent of n and is at most 1−1/e for different constants c; thereby completing the proof.
We would like to note that the continuity of the CDF of the input distributions is a useful and
natural property that can be used by an FTA. This is because making this assumption allows us to
design a (1−1/e)-approximation algorithm, as shown by Theorem 19, but not assuming this puts a
barrier of 1/2 for any FTA, which is shown in [FGL15, EHLM17]. For example, in the above instance
the approximation factor without assuming continuity would be at most (e − 2)/(e − 1) ≈ 0.58,
which is below the 1− 1/e ≈ 0.63 claim of Theorem 19. This contradiction is because without this
assumption on the input distribution the algorithm could not set τ in a way that the probability
of selecting an item becomes exactly 1− 1/e.
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A Extension of FTAs to Bipartite Matchings
Here we study the set of algorithms that use m fixed thresholds τ1, . . . , τm for the items and have
a recommendation strategy which at the arrival of every buyer offers her an item at its fixed price.
In particular, when buyer i arrives the algorithm recommends an unsold item k to her and she
accepts to buy it if vi,k ≥ τk, i.e. her valuation for the item is greater than or equal to its price.
Theorem 22. For every instance of matching prophet secretary there exists a sequence of fixed
thresholds τ1, . . . , τk and a randomized algorithm which is (1− 1/e)-approximation in expectation.
Proof. Our general approach is to extend the methods we have for single item FTA’s to an algorithm
for matchings. This generalization is similar to a reduction from matchings to single items. However,
there are some details that we have to consider. We first show a stronger claim than the statement
of Theorem 19 which holds for a specific inputs class of prophet secretary. Then we propose a
randomized algorithm which exploits the single item algorithm for that class in order to find such
fixed thresholds that lead to a (1− 1/e)-approximation algorithm for matchings.
We note that the analysis of Theorem 19 indicates we can find a single threshold such that
every item will be seen with probability at least 1 − 1/e. More precisely, the analysis shows that
the algorithm gets the same approximation factor from the utility of every buyer, i.e., E[Utility] ≥
(1− 1/e) ·∑ni=1 E[vi · 1vi≥τ ]. Now, if an input instance guarantees ∑ni=1 Pr[vi > 0] ≤ 1 then
E[Revenue] =
(
1− 1
e
)
τ
≥
(
1− 1
e
)
τ
n∑
i=1
Pr[vi > 0]
≥
(
1− 1
e
) n∑
i=1
E[vi · 1vi<τ ] .
This results in
E[Alg] = E[Revenue] + E[Utility]
≥
(
1− 1
e
) n∑
i=1
(E[vi · 1vi<τ ] + E[vi · 1vi≥τ ])
=
(
1− 1
e
) n∑
i=1
E[vi] .
The following claim formally states the above result.
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Claim 23. If the input of prophet secretary guarantees
∑n
i=1 Pr[vi > 0] ≤ 1, then there exists an
FTA such that
E[Alg] ≥
(
1− 1
e
) n∑
i=1
E[vi] .
Now we demonstrate how the matching problem reduces to the instances describe above. Let
us assume we already know thresholds τ1, . . . , τm for the m items. Upon the arrival of buyer i and
realizing vi we use the following algorithm to recommend an item k to buyer i. We first calculate
probabilities p1, . . . , pm where pk(vi) := Prv−i [(i, k) ∈ M(vi ∪ v−i)] and M(B) is the maximum
matching 6 of a bipartite graph B. These are in fact the probabilities of each of those edges
belonging to the maximum matching. Then, by drawing a random number r ∈ [0, 1] we select a
candidate item k if
∑k−1
l=1 pl < r ≤
∑k
l=1 pl. In this way, we dependently select a candidate such
that every k becomes selected with probability pk. Note that the algorithm might sometimes select
none of the items, in which cases there will be no candidate. Finally we recommend item k to buyer
i if the item is still unsold, and she buys it if vi,k ≥ τk.
The above method for candidate selection has a close relationship with the optimum solution.
To put it into perspective, let us define a new distribution Dˆi : R
m → [0, 1] for every buyer i.
This distribution is supposed to show the valuations of i on the items when they are selected as
candidates. In other words, for every vector x = 〈x1, . . . , xm〉 in which at most one of xk’s is
non-zero we have Pr
vˆi∼Dˆi
[vˆi = x] := Evi∼Di [1vi,k=xk · 1k is a candidate]. Equivalently, Dˆi can be
interpreted as the distribution of the value of the edge incident to i in the maximum matching.
This is true because we select a candidate with the probability that it belongs to the maximum
matching. Therefore:
E[OPT] = Ev∼D[M(v)] =
n∑
i=1
E
vˆi∼Dˆi
[
m∑
k=1
vˆi,k] . (13)
Now we reduce the problem to the single item case. By looking at a scenario of the problem
from the viewpoint of item k we notice that the whole scenario and the algorithm run equivalent
to the single item case. This item observes the buyers in a random order such that the valuation of
buyer i comes from Dˆi. These scenarios occur in parallel for all the items, because no two items are
offered to buyers at the same time. In addition, every item k is offered to a buyer with an overall
probability of
n∑
i=1
Pr
vˆi∼Dˆi
[vˆi,k > 0] =
n∑
i=1
Evi,v−i [1vi,k>0 · 1(i,k)∈M(vi∪v−i)]
= Prv∼D[k is matched] ≤ 1 .
Now we can use the result of Claim 23. The right hand side of Equality (13) can be written
as
∑m
k=1
∑n
i=1 Evˆi∼Dˆi
[vˆi,k]. The claim states that there exists a threshold τk such that the FTA
achieves at least (1− 1/e)∑ni=1 Evˆi∼Dˆi [vˆi,k] for every item k. Therefore our algorithm is (1− 1/e)-
approximation for the matching of all items.
6WLOG we can assume it is unique for every graph.
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